

ES Journal

ANNO IV
N° 6



**ALL'INTERSEZIONE
TRA CINEMA E IA**

~~kaplan~~

ES Journal

ALL'INTERSEZIONE
TRA CINEMA E IA

a cura di
Simone Arcagni
Pietro Lafiandra

~~—k a p l a n—~~

Emerging Series Journal

anno IV, n. 6

2025

Direttore

Simone Arcagni

Comitato Direttivo

Pietro Lafiandra, Stefano Locati, Simona Pezzano, Federico Selvini

Caporedattore

Pierandrea Villa

Redazione

Pietro Lafiandra, Stefano Locati, Simona Pezzano, Maria Raffa, Federico Selvini, Alessio Tozzi

Comitato Scientifico

Matteo Bittanti (Università IULM), Chiara Canali (Università degli Studi eCampus), Gianni Canova (Università IULM), Daniela Cardini (Università IULM), Andrea Chiurato (Università IULM), Luisa Damiano (Università IULM), Anna Luigia De Simone (Università IULM), Guido Di Fraia (Università IULM), Bruno Di Marino (Accademia di Belle Arti di Roma), Luisella Farinotti (Università IULM), Ester Fuoco (Università IULM), Kamilia Kard (Accademia di Belle Arti di Brera), Pietro Lafiandra (Università IULM), Stefano Locati (Università IULM), Riccardo Manzotti (Università IULM), Tatiana Mazali (Politecnico di Torino), Davide Mezzino (Università IULM), Andrea Miconi (Università IULM), Elisabetta Modena (Università IULM), Anna Maria Monteverdi (Università degli Studi di Milano), Simona Pezzano (Università IULM), Gino Roncaglia (Università Roma Tre), Maria Pia Rossignaud (Osservatorio TuttiMedia), Giulio Sangiorgio (Università IULM), Federico Selvini (Università IULM), Francesco Spampinato (Università di Bologna), Valentina Tanni (John Cabot University), Vincenzo Trione (Università IULM), Pierandrea Villa (Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo).

Redazione:

Dipartimento di Comunicazione, arti e media “Giampaolo Fabris”
Via Carlo Bo, 1 20143 Milano | e-mail: es.redazione@gmail.com

Edizioni kaplan S.a.s.

Via Saluzzo, 42 bis - 10125 Torino
tel 011-7495609
info@edizionikaplan.com | www.edizionikaplan.com

ISBN 978-88-99559-90-8 | ISSN 2421-4663

INDICE

5 Istruzioni per l'uso

6 Simone Arcagni e Pietro Lafiandra: *Nuovo cinema AI*

9 Filorosso

10 Andrea Colamedici: *La fine della parentesi Lumière? Cinema, IA e il futuro dell'esperienza visiva*

17 Chiara Canali: *AI Video Generation: storia, evoluzione e problematiche attuali. Dalle "poor images" di Internet ai nuovi modelli "simulacrali" della realtà*

27 Francesco D'Isa e Lorenzo Manera: *Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency*

42 Elia Zanardi: *Oltre lo schermo: etica e diritto nell'epoca dell'intelligenza artificiale*

58 Pietro Lafiandra: *Miss Polly Had a Dolly: anatomia di un film prodotto con l'intelligenza artificiale*

75 Giulio Sangiorgio: *The Egggregores' Theory - Intervista a Andrea Gatopoulos*

84 Riccardo Milanesi: *Cinema e intelligenza artificiale tra narrazione e premonizione*

95 Pietro Lafiandra: *Conversazioni con la macchina - Il dialogo dell'arte con le intelligenze artificiali - Intervista a Valentina Tanni*

100 Mariano Equizzi: *Burning Cinema*

107 Simone Arcagni: *AI in the Archive. Jan Bot e l'armadio*

115 Visioni

125 Controcampo

126 Intervista a Giovanni Abitante

131 Intervista a Flavio Pizzorno

135 Intervista a Mateusz Miroslaw Lis

138 Intervista a Massimo Toniato



istruzioni per l'uso

Nuovo cinema AI

Simone Arcagni, Pietro Lafiandra | Università IULM, Milano

L'integrazione dei modelli di intelligenza artificiale nei processi di generazione delle immagini in movimento ha aperto un nuovo spazio di sperimentazione per registi, *digital artist*, *new media artist* e videomaker che si sono confrontati con nuove forme di *storytelling*, esplorando linguaggi ibridi capaci di attraversare il video musicale, lo spot pubblicitario e il cortometraggio narrativo. Nuove pratiche si sono rapidamente diffuse attraverso territori para-cinematografici come i meme e la pornografia, per trovare una prima istituzionalizzazione nell'arte contemporanea e nel cinema, contribuendo a ridefinire il nostro rapporto con gli artefatti audiovisivi. Sebbene non esista, a oggi, una tassonomia codificata in merito, è indubbio che alcuni strumenti IA abbiano ampliato l'accesso ai processi di produzione iconografica e cinematografica, consentendo a nuovi soggetti di intervenire nella creazione di contenuti visivi e modificando radicalmente il lessico del *fare cinema*. I cosiddetti sistemi TTI (*text-to-image*) e TTV (*text-to-video*), insieme ai video *deepfake*, ai cloni vocali e alla scrittura del *prompt*, hanno significativamente ridotto tempi e costi di produzione. Questo ha favorito la diffusione di nuove pratiche, spesso caratterizzate da una matrice partecipativa e orizzontale, con conseguente stravolgimento delle mansioni, delle competenze e persino dei ruoli tradizionali come quelli di cineasta, attore, animatore. Al contempo, le possibili applicazioni dell'intelligenza artificiale nel ciclo produttivo hanno posto l'industria cinematografica di fronte alla necessità (ma, sottolineiamolo, anche all'opportunità) di ripensare il proprio rapporto con una tecnologia ben lontana dall'essere un mero strumento tecnico, e che si sta invece configurando come un vero e proprio agente culturale capace di ridefinire la grammatica del rappresentabile e la pragmatica dello sguardo, di sovvertire le logiche produttive consolidate e di rimettere in discussione il concetto stesso di autorialità. In questa prospettiva, si riattivano interrogativi fondamentali: cosa significa essere un regista cinematografico oggi? È possibile un cinema frutto di una logica conversazionale con gli algoritmi? Quali nuove sfide si profilano per l'industria? Chi sono i registi che hanno lavorato con gli algoritmi generativi, e quali sono i film fondamentali che tracciano i primordi di queste nuove forme? Qual è la natura delle immagini algoritmiche? Il numero *Cinema e intelligenza artificiale* si propone di analizzare criticamente le implicazioni estetiche, etiche e politiche dell'impiego dell'intelligenza artificiale nell'ambito della settima arte attraverso studi di caso esemplari (con particolare attenzione per il panorama italiano), interrogando quelle figure che hanno ipotizzato nuove

vie per la frammentaria costellazione dell'audiovisivo contemporaneo, mettendo in luce le criticità formali, giuridiche e concettuali esposte in campo artistico dai nuovi processi di collaborazione uomo-macchina. Un dialogo con artisti e studiosi che torna a indagare il cinema come luogo privilegiato per la nascita di immaginari, laboratorio politico e terreno d'avanguardia per le nuove tecnologie, oggi chiamato a ripensare radicalmente il proprio statuto ontologico per far fronte a un rinnovamento che sta investendo la società tutta.

Gli interrogativi e le questioni poste dalla rivoluzione dell'IA, che tenderà sempre più a diventare una vera e propria infrastruttura paragonabile per il suo impatto a quella di Internet, sono un terreno a oggi particolarmente paludoso: da una parte per l'accelerazione delle tecnologie, dall'altra per il susseguirsi di proposte, sia dal punto di vista giuridico che etico. Si ha l'impressione che si stia osservando un sistema ai suoi primordi che implicherà un cambiamento profondo, non solo nell'industria dell'audiovisivo, ma in generale in ogni scomparto della comunicazione, dell'informazione, della cultura e della società. Le modalità con cui il settore cinematografico risponderà a questo cambiamento sono estremamente difficili da prevedere. Non ci resta allora che indagare i fenomeni, provare a osservare i processi e i loro decorsi, provare a collazionare punti di vista differenti, sia negli approcci che nelle conclusioni, rilanciando così un dibattito che riesca ad essere fertile e soprattutto utile ad accompagnare i cambiamenti in corso.

In *La fine della parentesi Lumière? Cinema, IA e il futuro dell'esperienza visiva*, Andrea Colamedici si concentra su come l'intelligenza artificiale stia trasformando il cinema da esperienza collettiva e autoriale a consumo personalizzato e algoritmico, ponendo interrogativi critici su alterità, memoria culturale e futuro dell'immaginazione visiva. Chiara Canali, nel suo *AI Video Generation: storia, evoluzione e problematiche attuali. Dalle "poor images" di Internet ai nuovi modelli "simulacrali" della realtà*, analizza l'evoluzione della generazione video tramite intelligenza artificiale, evidenziando le sue potenzialità creative, i limiti qualitativi (come le "poor images") e la nascita di un nuovo modello "simulacrale" di rappresentazione della realtà. Nel loro *Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency* Francesco D'Isa e Lorenzo Manera interpretano invece il fenomeno dei *deepfake* come segni ideogrammatici, strumenti comunicativi più che rappresentativi, che riflettono il passaggio dall'immagine come prova all'immagine come segnale nell'ambiente digitale. In *Oltre lo schermo: etica e diritto nell'epoca dell'intelligenza artificiale* Elia Zanardi affronta le problematiche etiche correlate all'impiego dell'IA, concentrandosi sul contesto artistico con particolare attenzione al cinema, per poi articolare un'analisi comparativa sul piano normativo tra Europa, Italia e Stati Uniti. In *Miss Polly Had a Dolly: anatomia di un film prodotto con l'intelligenza artificiale* Pietro Lafiandra propone un'indagine che attraversa i livelli estetici e produttivi di *Miss Polly Had a Dolly* (2023), cortometraggio da lui realizzato in co-regia con Flavio Pizzorno

e Andrea Rossini, primo esempio di opera selezionata in concorso da un festival cinematografico italiano di rilievo internazionale – il Torino Film Festival – ad avvalersi degli algoritmi generativi per la creazione dell’immagine, della recitazione e della componente sonora. L’intervista ad Andrea Gatopoulos, condotta da Giulio Sangiorgio, costituisce un’articolata riflessione sulla genesi e sulle implicazioni teoriche di *The Eggregores’ Theory*, primo cortometraggio – composto interamente da immagini fisse generate tramite intelligenza artificiale e presentato come evento speciale alla 39ª Settimana Internazionale della Critica (2024) – a essere proiettato alla Mostra Internazionale d’Arte Cinematografica di Venezia. Nel saggio *Cinema e intelligenza artificiale tra narrazione e premonizione* Riccardo Milanesi concentra invece la propria analisi su *Cassandra* di Demetra Birtone, produzione Rai Cinema e Scuola Holden, da lui co-sceneggiata con Filippo Losito, una delle prime esperienze di ibridazione tra riprese *live-action* e intelligenze artificiali generative. Nell’intervista con Valentina Tanni ci si addenterà invece nel suo ultimo *Conversazioni con la macchina. Il dialogo dell’arte con le intelligenze artificiali* (Flon, 2025) per provare a capire le forme e le prospettive del “dialogo” tra artisti e algoritmi. *Burning Cinema* di Mariano Equizzi è un denso saggio critico-sperimentale che esplora l’uso dell’intelligenza artificiale nella produzione di immagini e video come pratica post-cinematografica e controculturale, in continuità con le avanguardie storiche. L’articolo di Simone Arcagni *AI in the Archive. Jan Bot e l’armadio* esplora infine le potenzialità dell’intelligenza artificiale applicata agli archivi cinematografici, tra valorizzazione automatica del patrimonio storico e riflessione critica sulla funzione autoriale e sulle logiche del senso, per poi proporre una riflessione più personale, partendo da un archivio “minimo” – l’armadio contenente il girato del documentario *Tutto l’oro che c’è* (2019) di Andrea Caccia – per immaginare un utilizzo “alienato” e creativo dell’IA: non più per insegnare cosa sia il cinema, ma per metterne in crisi l’idea stessa.



filorosso



ES Journal

Elcott, Noam M. e Tim Trombley. “AI Imaging, or the End of Photography and the Affordances of Latent Specificity.” In *The World through AI: Exploring Latent Spaces*, a cura di Antonio Somaini e Quentin Bajac. Jeu de Paume / JBE Books, 2025.

Epstein, Zachary, et al. “Art and the Science of Generative AI: A Deeper Dive.” *Science* 380, n. 6650 (2023): 1110–1111, <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.adh4451>.

Reumont, François. “László Gaál Uses AI to Shoot Porsches in Ferrari Land: ‘The Humor behind the Machine’.” *AFC*, 2 aprile 2025. <https://www.afcinema.com/Laszlo-Gaal-uses-AI-to-shoot-Porsches-in-Ferrari-land.html?lang=fr>

Manovich, Lev. *L'estetica dell'Intelligenza Artificiale: Modelli digitali e analitica culturale*, a cura di Valentino Catricalà. Luca Sossella Editore, 2020.

Manovich, Lev e Emanuele Arielli. *Artificial Aesthetics: Generative AI, Art and Visual Media*. 2024. <https://manovich.net/index.php/projects/artificial-aesthetics>.

Miller, Arthur I. *The Artist in the Machine: The World of AI-Powered Creativity*. The MIT Press, 2019.

Nyame, Lord, e Staphord Bengesi. “Generative Artificial Intelligence Trend on Video Generation,” 3 settembre 2024. <https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202409.0195.v1>.

Somaini, Antonio. “Algorithmic Images: Artificial Intelligence and Visual Culture.” *Grey Room*, n. 93 (autunno 2023): 74–115.

Steyerl, Hito. “In difesa dell’immagine povera.” In *The City of Broken Windows*, a cura di Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev e Marcella Vecellio. Skira, 2018.

Steyerl, Hito. “Mean Images.” *New Left Review*, n. 140/141 (marzo–giugno 2023): 82–97.

Zhou, Pengyuan, Lin Wang, Zhi Liu, et. al. “A Survey on Generative AI and LLM for Video Generation.” *arXiv:2404.16038v1 [cs.CV]*, (2024), <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2404.16038>

Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency

Francesco D’Isa, Lorenzo Manera | Università di Modena e Reggio
Emilia

Abstract

This paper explores the evolving cultural role of deepfakes, arguing that their primary function is no longer evidentiary but symbolic. Drawing on media theory, meme sociology, and visual culture studies, it introduces the concept of the “image-ideogram”: a recognisable, modular visual sign that circulates rapidly online, conveying stance and emotion rather than truth. The study traces a genealogy from Bazin’s “indexical photography” to Baudrillard’s “simulacra” and Steyerl’s “poor images”, framing deepfakes as linguistic tools within a hypermemetic economy. Empirical cases – *DeepTomCruise*, *Macron Disco*, *Trump Gaza*, and *Ernesto* – illustrate how synthetic videos operate as emotional and rhetorical packets, not as deception. Despite technological sophistication, deepfakes are rarely persuasive; their impact lies in shaping perception and public discourse. The paper argues that viewers interpret deepfakes similarly to emojis or GIFs: as context-dependent emblems. Ultimately, deepfakes exemplify a broader shift from realism to symbolic currency, where images act as agents in cultural exchange rather than as proofs of reality.

Keywords: deepfake; image-ideograms; simulacra; hypermemetic economy; memetic portability.

Introduction

In barely five years *deepfake* has leapt from computer-vision papers to prime-time talk shows and TikTok feeds, yet the predicted collapse of visual truth has not arrived. Large-scale studies show that photorealistic forgeries seldom persuade; some iconic clips of 2020-2025 (*DeepTomCruise*, *Macron Disco*, *Ernesto*, *Trump Gaza*) spread as punch-lines, stickers, or spectacles, not as evidence.

This puzzle drives our question: what work do deepfakes perform? We propose the notion of the *image-ideogram*: a modular sign whose value lies in use, speed, and spread. Photorealistic synthesis has shifted from an epistemic promise (*seeing is believing*) to a linguistic resource (*seeing is signalling*).

Two theoretical threads scaffold the claim. A genealogical arc of the moving image runs from Bazin’s indexical photograph, through Baudrillard’s simulacrum,

to the image-ideogram, an audiovisual token prized for instant recognisability and memetic portability. In parallel, Limor Shifman's meme sociology (content-form-stance) and Gretchen McCulloch's pragmatics of emoji explain why falsity is no barrier to viral success.¹

We analyse four emblematic cases: *DeepTomCruise*, whose face-swap sketches became universal reaction GIFs; *Macron Disco*, a self-parody swiftly weaponised by protesters; *Ernest*, an AI singer whose synthetic back-story still drew real tears; and, above all, *Trump Gaza*, a kitsch redevelopment fantasy that flipped from satire to self-glorification.

Our payoff is cultural rather than legal. Deepfakes matter most in the scroll, where images trade as quick-fire symbols, not in courtrooms that adjudicate truth claims. We show that their power lies in shaping stance and mood, so the urgent shift is from judging *how real they look* to tracing *how and by whom they circulate*.

1.1 The Indexical Regime

In the seminal 1945 essay “The Ontology of the Photographic Image”, Bazin defined photography as “the most important event in the history of the visual arts”, since it enabled “western painting to rid itself once and for all of its obsession with realism and to rediscover its aesthetic autonomy”.² Since the photographer can control – among other aspects – the selection of the object to be photographed, but not the image's formation, photographs are intended as indexical signs, representations that function in relation to an automatic mode of production. Such a link is related to the automatic link created between what is captured by the camera and the image that emerges from it, the indexical paradigm. If in the western tradition the image was typically treated as a secondary copy — an “image-of” something already real, assumed to possess less being and less truth than the thing it depicted and upon which it relied, the coming of photography turned that logic. Bazin, with his interpretation of the photographic process as a semi-automatic phenomenon which entails “the eye of the machine”, was among the first scholars who noted how, with the invention of photography, the old equation of image as a function of reality was flipping. In fact, reality was becoming a function of the image, and reality's claim to existence was increasingly grounded in its being rendered as an image:

1 André Bazin, and Hugh Grey, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image [1945],” *Film Quarterly* 13, no. 4 (1960): 4–9; Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacres et simulation* (Editions Galilée, 1981); Gretchen McCulloch, *Because Internet. Understanding the New Rules of Language* (Riverhead Books, 2019); Limor Shifman, *Memes in Digital Culture* (MIT Press, 2013).

2 Bazin and Grey, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 9.

Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency

The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions of time and space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored, no matter how lacking, in documentary value the image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; it is the model.³

The process of dissolution of the western image conception, meaning the antithesis between a model and a copy, saw among the results the development of the concept of simulacrum, intended as an image unrelated to a representational function, signs lacking any real referent and severed from any original model.

1.2 From Imprint to Simulacrum

The concept of simulacrum was deepened in the 1960s, in the French philosophical context by Deleuze, Foucault, Klossowski and, later, by Baudrillard. As Michael Camille noted in his historical-philosophical analysis of such a concept, the term had already resurfaced in post-war French discourse and was used by Surrealists—especially in writings by Georges Bataille and Pierre Klossowski—to capture the incommunicable aspects of the pictorial sign.⁴ In his 1967 essay “The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy”, the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze set out to “overturn Platonism,” thereby re-establishing the notion of the simulacrum as a key concept in contemporary critical theory and art history. If Deleuze’s perspective aimed at discussing the Platonic hierarchy that privileges the model over the copy, proposing instead a framework in which the simulacrum was no longer confined to the status of a mere imitation,⁵ Baudrillard’s interpretation of the conceptual category of Simulacrum took on a different direction,⁶ relevant for the purpose of this chapter. As Natalie Pfaff recently underlined,⁷ Baudrillard categorized technical images such as film, video, and television within analogue and digital forms and described the images’ development as a gradual detachment from reality, which follows several phases.⁸ Firstly, the images behave almost like a faithful mirror. They gather the textures, proportions and emotional weight of the world and return them to us intact, so that looking at the picture feels indistinguishable

3 Bazin and Grey, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” 9.

4 Michael Camille, “Simulacrum,” in *Critical Terms for Art History*, ed. Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff (The University of Chicago Press, 2003).

5 Gilles Deleuze, “The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy,” in *Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense*, ed. Constance V. Boundas (Columbia University Press, 1990).

6 Jean Baudrillard, *Simulacres et simulation* (Editions Galilée, 1981).

7 Natalie Pfaff, “The Divine Irrelevance of Images: From Husserl’s Image Object to Baudrillard’s Simulacrum,” in *Husserl on Depiction*, ed. Regina-Nino Mion, Claudio Rozzoni, and John B. Brough (Routledge, 2025).

8 Baudrillard, *Simulacres et simulation*, 6.

from confronting the thing itself. Secondly, this mirror begins to warp. Subtle re-touching, selective framing and endless repetition turn the image into a mask that edits, sweetens or distorts what it once merely reflected; reality is still there, but it arrives filtered through aesthetic and ideological lenses. In the third stage, the mask grows opaque. The picture no longer promises access to an underlying truth but rather hides the fact that such a truth has slipped away. Finally, all reference points vanish. The image cuts its last remaining ties to the real, floating free as a self-contained sign that refers only to other signs. What began as representation ended as pure simulacrum, a dazzling surface whose meaning is generated entirely within the closed circuit of images themselves. Such a detachment brought to the existence of images that generate their own simulacra, which can be categorized in three orders: imitation, production, and reproduction. If both simulation and images elude representation, and the state of simulation is defined by simulacra, which are empty representations that exist in a circuit where the reference to truth is not foreseen, the loss of referentiality is inevitable. The pertinence of Baudrillard's theory of Simulacra to interpret the contemporary deepfake phenomenon has been recently deepened by Marcel Danesi. His view is based on the idea that an ever-broadening spread of a simulacrum culture is taking place: the advent and growing entrenchment of "a deepfake culture as a spin-off of the simulacrum culture".⁹

1.3 The Poor Image and the Attention Economy

Where the simulacrum severs reference, the *poor image* (Hito Steyerl's term for the endlessly recompressed file) reconfigures value itself. In her 2009 essay Steyerl describes a class of pictures that travel at accelerated speed, compressed, re-uploaded, re-edited, ripped, remixed until their resolution disintegrates but their visibility multiplies.¹⁰ Under conditions of broadband abundance and platform competition, circulation eclipses clarity: the image becomes a unit of attention, exchanged like a low-denomination coin across social feeds.

Deepfakes inherit this logic while subverting its premise: they arrive in high definition yet are consumed as if they were poor. Once a synthetic clip enters the meme stream, viewers treat 4K fidelity as optional garnish; what matters is the iconic nugget ready to be screenshotted, looped, and pasted into new contexts. The paradox is instructive: technological sophistication now serves a purpose defined by Steyerl's low-fi economy. The higher the realism budget, the faster the artefact is

9 Marcel Danesi, "Simulacrum Culture," in *AI-Generated Popular Culture. A Semiotic Perspective* (Springer Nature, 2024), 159–174.

10 Hito Steyerl, "In Defense of the Poor Image," *e-flux Journal* 10, November 2009, <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/10/61362/in-defense-of-the-poor-image>.

Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency

flattened into an ideogrammatic token whose currency is speed and recognisability. In this sense, the poor image furnishes the infrastructural logic within which the deepfake can function as linguistic resource rather than evidentiary trace.

1.4 Memes as Composite Units: Content – Form – Stance, Hypermemetic Logic, and Low-Threshold Participation

Limor Shifman urges us to treat an Internet meme as “(a) a group of digital items sharing common characteristics of content, form, and/or stance; (b) that were created with awareness of each other; and (c) were circulated, imitated, and/or transformed via the Internet by many users”.¹¹ Content names the narrative kernel, form the sensory wrapper (visual layout, duration, typography), stance the communicative attitude, like irony, earnestness, indignation.¹² Content and form hold the cluster together; stance is the variable users flip. Leave Britney Alone keeps the same webcam close-up and catch-phrase across parodies while swinging from pathos to ridicule.¹³

The same triad maps onto deepfakes: DeepTomCruise locks the Cruise persona and slick face-swap while toggling between tech-awe and slapstick; Macron Disco freezes the VHS disco shell yet shifts from self-branding to mockery; Trump Gaza fixes its gold idol and kitsch fly-through but travels as satire or propaganda. Such elasticity thrives in what Shifman calls a hypermemetic environment, where every public event spawns clouds of derivatives. Low-threshold remix turns deepfakes into “normative debate about how the world should look and the best way to get there”.¹⁴

In short, the content-form-stance framework explains why deepfakes thrive even when their falsity is evident: they provide a recognisable template that anyone can instantly inflect with a chosen stance, making each clip endlessly adaptable and shareable.

1.5 From Emoji to GIFs: Online Gesture, “Packet” Language, and Context

Gretchen McCulloch’s *Because Internet* reframes the small visuals that populate chats and feeds as a full-fledged gesture system carried over into writing. Emoji, she notes, “don’t just have one function, they have a range of them ... it’s the same

11 Limor Shifman, *Memes in Digital Culture* (MIT Press, 2013), 7–8.

12 Shifman, *Memes in Digital Culture*, 44–46.

13 Limor Shifman, “An Anatomy of a YouTube Meme,” *New Media & Society* 14, no. 2 (2011): 187–203, <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444811412160>.

14 Shifman, *Memes in Digital Culture*, 120.

range that gestures have,” which explains their explosive uptake as soon as phones and platforms made them easy to send.¹⁵

Borrowing the term *emblem* from gesture studies, McCulloch shows that many high-frequency emoji behave like thumbs-up or winks offline: they possess precise forms and stable meanings, instantly recognisable even without accompanying words. Their semantic fixity makes them reliable pragmatic cues as tiny, self-contained speech-acts.

Read through this lens, viral deepfake clips extend the same pragmatics. Like supersized emoji, they stabilise a recognisable motif (Cruise’s grin, Macron’s disco move, Trump’s gilded statue) and circulate as stance-markers: admiration, irony, outrage. Their persuasive force lies not in being believed but in being fit for insertion, visual packets ready for memetic redeployment. Deepfakes, in short, upscale the emblematics of emoji into high-definition video, preparing the ground for what we term the image-ideogram.

3. Towards the Image-Ideogram

If the *poor image* explains how pictures move, the image-ideogram explains what they do once in motion. We adopt the linguistic term *ideogram* for a sign grasped immediately and deployed combinatorially, independent of alphabetic spelling. Three intertwined attributes mark a deepfake that succeeds in this role.

1. *Instant recognisability.* Viral deepfakes condense a single, highly legible motif. Recognition precedes interpretation, echoing Shifman’s claim that memes are stabilised by *content* and *form* while their *stance* remains negotiable.¹⁶
2. *Memetic portability.* Once identified, the clip is quickly shareable. Such portability performs the very function that McCulloch ascribes to emoji and GIFs: a pragmatic cue that communicates attitude faster than words can.¹⁷ The deepfake, though technically high-definition footage, behaves linguistically.
3. *Referential indifference.* Because an ideogram’s value is pragmatic, strict veracity becomes optional. Viewers savour the hyper-real sheen even when they know it is fabricated; what anchors meaning is not factual reference but the clip’s built-in emblem already loaded with a clear, bite-size message. Context (who posts it, under which hashtag, to which crowd) then tilts that emblem toward admiration, irony, or outrage. In short, the deepfake’s truth-status is second-

15 Gretchen McCulloch, *Because Internet. Understanding the New Rules of Language* (Riverhead Books, 2019), 160–161.

16 Shifman, *Memes in Digital Culture*.

17 McCulloch, *Because Internet*.

Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency

ary to the double work it performs: first, condensing a legible symbol; second, circulating that symbol through ever-shifting paratexts.

These traits complete the trajectory outlined in this section: from the *index* that testified, through the *simulacrum* that masked, via the *poor image* that circulated, to the *image-ideogram* that signals. Deepfakes materialise this evolution in pure form, transforming photorealistic synthesis from an epistemic promise into the pictographic currency of twenty-first-century discourse.

Deepfakes do not act as isolated files but as what Alfred Gell calls *extended objects*, whose person and artefacts form a single entity distributed in time and space.¹⁸ Their agency unfolds through reposts, remixes and comment threads: each derivative frame becomes an index that motivates inferences and responses in the minds of recipients. The initial wow-effect, the halo effect of technical difficulty that enchants the uninitiated quickly gives way to social propagation. In this sense the deepfake exemplifies Gell's *technology of enchantment*: it recruits users not by proving reality, but by enrolling them in a network of intentionalities (likes, retweets, ironic captions) that amplify its ideogrammatic punch.¹⁹

2.1 Contemporary Visual-Agency Debate

For several decades now, visual culture studies have rejected the representationalist stance, emphasizing how technical images are not to be intended as passive representations, but rather as agents endowed with agency, active interlocutors in human experience, capable of shaping perception, mediating knowledge, participating in the production of meaning and eliciting responses in their viewers. As Emmanuel Alloa and Chiara Cappelletto underlined,²⁰ such a perspective stems from Aby Warburg's idea of visual forms as crystallized affects and by his metaphor of images as "energy-containers".²¹ The agency of images became, many years later, a recurrent topic in the field of visual studies. In his 1989 essay, David Freedberg explored the idea of images intended as active instances and generative agents,²² while Alfred

18 Alfred Gell, *Art and Agency. An Anthropological Theory* (Clarendon Press, 1998).

19 "Seen in this light, a person and a person's mind are not confined to particular spatio-temporal coordinates, but consist of a spread of biographical events and memories of events, and a dispersed category of material objects, traces, and leavings which can be attributed to a person and which, in aggregate, testify to agency and patienthood during a biographical career"; Alfred Gell, "The Technology of Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology," in *Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics*, ed. Jeremy Coote and Anthony Shelton (Clarendon Press, 1992), 222.

20 Emmanuel Alloa and Chiara Cappelletto, eds., *Dynamics of the Image: Moving Images in a Global World* (Walter de Gruyter, 2020).

21 Aby Warburg, "Allgemeine Ideen," Warburg Institute WIA, III, 102.1.4.1, 1927.

22 David Freedberg, *The Power of Images. Studies in the History and Theory of Response* (Chicago University Press, 1989).

Gell in *Art and Agency* analyzed the agency of visual artifact from an anthropological perspective.²³ As noted by Alloa, Gell developed a theory of performativity which sees visual artifacts as the manifestation of the mind and uses them as means to an end.²⁴ A different view characterizes Horst Bredekamp's theory of the Bildakt,²⁵ based on the idea of images intended as prime movers, intrinsic begetters of action. As recently noted by Quartesan, for Bredekamp, one of the central tasks confronting visual-studies in the contemporary field is to engage critically with artificial intelligence generated images, heightening awareness of the ever-present danger of idolatry that accompanies our attempts to interpret these emerging visual forms. Because this peril is bound up with the very force that images exert, Bredekamp insists we bring the resulting tension to the surface, pinpoint the pictorial mechanism that produces it, and thereby sidestep misreadings of visual power. The spread of digital and AI-generated imagery, then, turns into a prime occasion for laying this tension bare. Bredekamp contends that the only way to avoid misjudging the strength of images is to acknowledge it first—an undertaking that calls for a cultural-historical excavation of the artificial layers that have accumulated on images over time.²⁶ In the case of deepfakes, that artificial stratum assumes a distinctive profile, one the following paragraphs will examine more closely.

3. Deepfake Persuasion: What the Evidence Actually Shows

Early commentary warned that once video forgery became photorealistic, the public would believe almost anything. Five years of empirical work complicates that fear. Across multiple disciplines, the emerging consensus is that deepfakes are, at best, modestly persuasive, and often not persuasive at all, while their most durable effect is a diffuse erosion of trust in other media, the so-called *liar's dividend*. One of the first large behavioral studies was run by Vaccari and Chadwick, who exposed U.S. respondents to the now-famous Obama/Jordan Peele demonstration video.²⁷ Participants found the clip striking, but it did not outperform a text-only

23 Gell, *Art and Agency*.

24 Emmanuel Alloa, "Performing an Appearance. On the Performativity of Images," *Paradigmi* 41, no. 3 (2023): 415–28.

25 Horst Bredekamp, *Image Acts: A Systematic Approach to Visual Agency*, ed. Elizabeth Clegg (Walter de Gruyter, 2018).

26 Ivan Quartesan, *La nuova iconologia di Horst Bredekamp. Storia dell'arte, morfologia e il potere delle immagini* (Mimesis, 2024).

27 Cristian Vaccari and Andrew Chadwick, "Deepfakes and Disinformation: Exploring the Impact of Synthetic Political Video on Deception, Uncertainty, and Trust in News," *Social Media + Society* 6, no. 1 (2020): 1–13, <https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120903408>.

Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency

fake on any measure of belief; the primary reaction was uncertainty, not conviction. A year later, Groh and colleagues systematically varied topic, language and production quality in five laboratory experiments with more than two thousand subjects. On average, people identified manipulated video or audio correctly in four cases out of five; when they erred, they tended to answer “not sure” rather than endorse the content. Deepfakes looked impressive, the authors conclude, but rarely crossed the threshold from suspicion to persuasion.²⁸

Follow-up work confirms the pattern. Hameleers compared skillfully crafted deepfakes with crude “cheapfakes” (simple speed changes, misleading captions). The low-tech cheats outperformed the high-tech versions in shifting attitudes—evidence that realism is not the decisive lever.²⁹ A meta-review by Ching and colleagues, covering twenty-two experiments published between 2018 and 2023, likewise finds no consistent persuasive advantage for synthetic video once partisanship, source cues and prior beliefs are taken into account.³⁰

Where deepfakes do have measurable impact is the aftertaste they leave behind. Weikmann and colleagues showed German respondents a fabricated video statement by a well-known politician, then debunked it. Belief in that specific clip fell sharply, yet confidence in authentic footage about the same topic dropped as well. The episode produced scepticism, not gullibility: an illustration of the liar’s dividend.³¹

Taken together, these studies align with our argument. Photorealistic synthesis enchants viewers long enough to be shared, but rarely long enough to be trusted. Its cultural power lies elsewhere: in supplying striking, endlessly re-captionable visuals that slot into the hypermemetic marketplace as stance markers and affective cues. In short, the deepfake’s most consequential role is not to fool the eye but to unsettle the evidentiary status of video as a whole, an outcome that dovetails with our notion of the image-ideogram.

28 Matthew Groh et al., “Human Detection of Political Speech Deepfakes Across Transcripts, Audio, and Video,” *Nature Communications* 15, no. 7629 (2024): 1–16, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-51998-z>.

29 Michael Hameleers, “Cheap Versus Deep Manipulation: The Effects of Cheapfakes Versus Deepfakes in a Political Setting,” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 36, no. 1 (2024): 1–9, <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edae004>.

30 Didier Ching et al., “Can Deepfakes Manipulate Us? Assessing the Evidence via a Critical Scoping Review,” *PLoS One* 20, no. 5 (2025): e0320124, <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0320124>.

31 Teresa Weikmann et al., “After Deception: How Falling for a Deepfake Affects the Way We See, Hear, and Experience Media,” *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 30, no. 1 (2025): 187–210, <https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612241233539>.

4. From Emoji Grins to Golden Idols: Three Deepfake Ideograms in Action

When @*deeptomcruise* exploded on TikTok in February 2021, with its first three clips racking up 11 million views in a week,³² the joke was never in doubt: VFX artist Chris Ume and impersonator Miles Fisher told reporters the stunt was just for fun.³³ Still, the face-swap's 30-second vertical format, all soft grading and handheld intimacy, turned Cruise's megawatt grin into an oversized emoji that users duetted, freeze-framed, and captioned either as tech-awe or slapstick hubris; the deepfake's lasting value lay not in optical trickery but in its portability as a reaction token. The Élysée repeated the pattern: its 10 February 2025 clip *AI, c'est la fête!* shows Emmanuel Macron disco-dancing in VHS pastiche, complete with "CLIP 100 % IA" disclaimer.³⁴ Supporters applauded the self-irony, yet within 72 hours, after millions TikTok views, opponents had stripped the disclaimer and looped the sequence under "Macron danse pendant que..." protest montages. Same pixels, inverted stance: the Shifman shift from stable content/form to negotiable attitude.

But "Trump Gaza" lays bare the deepfake's ideogrammatic core. Uploaded 6 February 2025 by artists Solo Avital and Ariel Vromen as a grotesque satire of billionaire hubris,³⁵ the AI resurrects Gaza as a Trump-branded Riviera: palm boulevards, a T-shaped casino, Elon Musk nibbling hummus, and a 30-metre golden Trump idol showered in dollar bills. The rendering is only semi-realistic, but its didascallic clarity (Trump = pharaonic conqueror) needs no polish. Trump reposted the video on Truth Social without comment. Conservatives cheered it as proof of visionary redevelopment;³⁶ Palestinian activists brandished the same idol as colonial kitsch. Content and form stay frozen, yet stance bifurcates into glorification or indictment. No one mistakes the clip for reportage, but everyone deploys its pictogram: supporters to hail triumph, critics to condemn vanity and cruelty. In Gell's terms the video becomes an extended composite object, its agency dif-

32 Lee Brown, "Deepfake Tom Cruise Goes Viral on TikTok with Over 11 Million Views," *New York Post*, 2 March 2021, <https://nypost.com/2021/03/02/deepfake-tom-cruise-goes-viral-on-tiktok-with-over-11m-views/>.

33 Alex Hern, "'I Don't Want to Upset People': Tom Cruise Deepfake Creator Speaks Out," *The Guardian*, 5 March 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/mar/05/how-started-tom-cruise-deepfake-tiktok-videos>.

34 *Le Monde*, "L'Élysée revendique un deepfake '100 % IA' pour promouvoir son sommet," 11 February 2025.

35 Rachel Hall, "Trump Gaza AI Video Intended as Political Satire, Says Creator," *The Guardian*, 6 March 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/mar/06/trump-gaza-ai-video-intended-as-political-satire-says-creator>.

36 *Breitbart News*, "Trump Shares AI Vision for Gaza Luxury Zone," 9 February 2025.

Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency

fused through retweets, parodies, explainers, and think-pieces. Photorealism supplies the initial enchantment; semantic value rides on context. The lesson across all three cases is clear: deepfakes prosper not by perfecting illusion but by furnishing instantly recognisable signs whose meaning is decided in the comment thread, not in the pixels.

A final twist on the ideogram argument arrived when an AI-generated contestant, marketed on YouTube as “Ernesto, the viral *America’s Got Talent* singer who doesn’t exist”, captured millions of views weeks before the 2025 season aired.³⁷ The channel AGTverseAI prefaced each upload with “This is not real footage and should not be interpreted as fact.” (video description, AGTverseAI, 28 May 2025), yet comments split between praise for “his” soulful delivery and debates over whether deepfake performers should “compete” against humans. No one believed Ernesto was a living person for long but the clip still worked: viewers wept, shared, and clipped sixty-second reaction edits on TikTok. “What’s really interesting though is that there are plenty in the comments and elsewhere online who know the video isn’t real – and still love it regardless”, states *The Guardian*.³⁸

Why? Because the video’s value lay in the emotion package it delivered rather than in any ontological claim about the singer. We don’t care what’s real: after all, don’t movies work pretty well? Yet we know they’re just acting. In our terms Ernesto functions as an image-ideogram of pathos: a ready-made unit of televised sentiment. The fact that some commenters missed or ignored the disclosure underscores, not undermines, the point; for much of the audience seeing is signalling, not evidentiary verification.

Ernesto does more than fix a recognizable motif ripe for memetic circulation; the audience’s reception shows that visual material can elicit genuine emotion even when its truth status is undisputedly fictional. Viewers tear up while fully aware that the singer “doesn’t exist”, a paradox already theorized for narrative cinema, where spectators feel fear, joy, or pity toward events they know to be invented.³⁹ In this sense Ernesto demonstrates that affective efficacy is decoupled from reference: what matters is not the ontological reality of the image but the pre-packaged emotion it delivers, instantly available for insertion into the feed just as films have packaged sentiment for over a century.

Ernesto thus complements *Trump Gaza*. Both clips stabilise content and form, yet

37 Gwilym Mumford, “Meet Ernesto, the Viral America’s Got Talent Contestant... Who Doesn’t Exist,” *The Guardian*, 30 May 2025, <https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2025/may/30/meet-ernesto-the-viral-america-got-talent-contestant-who-doesnt-exist>.

38 Mumford, “Meet Ernesto.”

39 Noël Carroll, *The Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes of the Heart* (Routledge, 1990); Carl Plantinga, *Moving Viewers: American Film and the Spectator’s Experience* (University of California Press, 2009).

ES Journal

their truth-status is secondary to the affective labour they perform. Whether the ideogram encodes triumphalist kitsch or televised vulnerability, its success is measured by share-rate and emotional uptake, not by realism. The episode confirms our thesis: deepfake culture foregrounds what images *do* in discourse, not what they *are* in the world.

Discussion: From Realism to Symbolic Currency

The case studies reveal a common dynamic. Deepfakes enter the feed with an initial promise of *wow*, yet their lasting power is not epistemic but ideogrammatic. Each clip condenses a recognisable motif and then circulates as a stance-marker whose meaning slides with context.

First, the evidence dismantles the “perfect hoax” narrative. None of the videos were broadly believed: detection was fast and belief shallow, in line with the experimental literature. Realism, we find, functions less as proof than as enchantment, drawing the gaze long enough for the clip to be copied, trimmed, or memed.

Second, agency proves to be distributed. Once released, a deepfake becomes what Gell would call an extended object: a network of master file, remixes, headlines, TikTok duets, and fact-checks that together perform social work.

Third, the governing logic is hypermemetic (Shifman). Production costs are low, remix interfaces are frictionless, and visibility metrics reward immediacy over accuracy. Under these conditions, the deepfake behaves like McCulloch’s packet gesture: a modular chunk of affect that users snap into conversation the way they once dropped a GIF or emoji. Photorealism is merely a fresh skin on an older linguistic function.

Finally, the cases illuminate a broader shift in visual culture. From Bazin’s indexical photograph to Baudrillard’s simulacrum, images have long drifted away from the real. The deepfake completes the arc: it is an image-ideogram, valued for speed, stance, and spread.

In short, the deepfake era is less a crisis of seeing than a reconfiguration of signaling. Whoever masters the new ideograms will wield the sharper rhetorical tool, whether for satire, self-mythology, or something we have yet to imagine.

Bibliography

Alloa, Emmanuel. “Performing an Appearance. On the Performativity of Images.” *Paradigmi* 41, no. 3 (2023): 415–28.

Alloa, Emmanuel, and Chiara Cappelletto, eds. *Dynamics of the Image: Moving Images in a Global World*. Walter de Gruyter, 2020.

Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency

Bazin, André, Hugh Grey. “The Ontology of the Photographic Image [1945]”. *Film Quarterly* 13, no. 4 (1960): 4–9.

Baudrillard, Jean. *Simulacres et simulation*. Editions Galilée, 1981.

Bredenkamp, Horst. *Image Acts: A Systematic Approach to Visual Agency*. Edited by Elizabeth Clegg, Walter de Gruyter, 2018.

Breitbart News. “Trump Shares AI Vision for Gaza Luxury Zone.” 9 February 2025.

Brown, Lee. “Deepfake Tom Cruise Goes Viral on TikTok with Over 11 Million Views.” *New York Post*, 2 March 2021. <https://nypost.com/2021/03/02/deepfake-tom-cruise-goes-viral-on-tiktok-with-over-11m-views/>.

Camille, Michael. “Simulacrum.” In *Critical Terms for Art History*, edited by Robert S. Nelson and Richard Shiff. The University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Carroll, Noël. *The Philosophy of Horror, or Paradoxes of the Heart*. Routledge, 1990.

Ching, Didier, John Twomey, Matthew P. Aylett, *et al.* “Can Deepfakes Manipulate Us? Assessing the Evidence via a Critical Scoping Review.” *PLoS One* 20, no. 5 (2025): e0320124. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0320124>.

Danesi, Marcel. “Simulacrum Culture.” In *AI-Generated Popular Culture. A Semiotic Perspective*. Springer Nature, 2024.

Deleuze, Gilles. “The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy” and “Plato and the Simulacrum.” In *Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense*, edited by Constance V. Boundas. Columbia University Press, 1990.

Freedberg, David. *The Power of Images. Studies in the History and Theory of Response*. Chicago University Press, 1989.

Gell, Alfred. “The Technology of Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology.” In *Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics*, edited by Jeremy Coote and Anthony Shelton. Clarendon Press, 1992.

Gell, Alfred. *Art and Agency. An Anthropological Theory*. Clarendon Press, 1998.

Groh, Matthew, Aruna Sankaranarayanan, Nikhil Singh, *et al.* “Human Detection of Political Speech Deepfakes Across Transcripts, Audio, and Video.” *Nature Communications* 15, no. 7629 (2024): 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-51998-z>.

ES Journal

Hall, Rachel. “Trump Gaza AI Video Intended as Political Satire, Says Creator.” *The Guardian*, 6 March 2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/mar/06/trump-gaza-ai-video-intended-as-political-satire-says-creator>.

Hameleers, Michael. “Cheap Versus Deep Manipulation: The Effects of Cheapfakes Versus Deepfakes in a Political Setting.” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 36, no. 1 (2024): 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edae004>.

Hern, Alex. “‘I Don’t Want to Upset People’: Tom Cruise Deepfake Creator Speaks Out.” *The Guardian*, 5 March 2021. <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/mar/05/how-started-tom-cruise-deepfake-tiktok-videos>.

Klossowski, Pierre. “A propos du simulacre dans la communication de Georges Bataille.” *Critique*, no. 195–196 (1963): 742–50.

Le Monde. “L’Élysée revendique un deepfake ‘100 % IA’ pour promouvoir son sommet”. 11 February 2025.

McCulloch, Gretchen. *Because Internet. Understanding the New Rules of Language*. Riverhead Books, 2019.

Mumford, Gwilym. “Meet Ernesto, the Viral *America’s Got Talent* Contestant... Who Doesn’t Exist.” *The Guardian*, 30 May 2025. <https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2025/may/30/meet-ernesto-the-viral-americas-got-talent-contestant-who-doesnt-exist>.

Pfaff, Natalie. “The Divine Irreference of Images: From Husserl’s Image Object to Baudrillard’s Simulacrum.” In *Husserl on Depiction*, edited by Regina-Nino Mion, Claudio Rozzoni, and John B. Brough. Routledge, 2025.

Plantinga, Carl. *Moving Viewers: American Film and the Spectator’s Experience*. University of California Press, 2009.

Quartesan, Ivan. *La nuova iconologia di Horst Bredekamp. Storia dell’arte, morfologia e il potere delle immagini*. Mimesis, 2024.

Shifman, Limor. “An Anatomy of a YouTube Meme.” *New Media & Society* 14, no. 2 (2011): 187–203. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444811412160>.

Shifman, Limor. *Memes in Digital Culture*. MIT Press, 2013.

Steyerl, Hito. “In Defense of the Poor Image.” *e-flux Journal* 10, November 2009. <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/10/61362/in-defense-of-the-poor-image>.

Deepfakes as Image-ideograms. From Realism to Symbolic Currency

Truth Social. @realDonaldTrump. Post sharing “Trump Gaza” video, 8 February 2025. <https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump>.

Vaccari, Cristian, and Andrew Chadwick. “Deepfakes and Disinformation: Exploring the Impact of Synthetic Political Video on Deception, Uncertainty, and Trust in News.” *Social Media + Society* 6, no. 1 (2020): 1–13. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120903408>.

Warburg, Aby. “Allgemeine Ideen.” Warburg Institute WIA, III, 102.1.4.1, 1927.

Weikmann, Teresa, Hannah Greber, and Alina Nikolaou. “After Deception: How Falling for a Deepfake Affects the Way We See, Hear, and Experience Media.” *The International Journal of Press/Politics* 30, no. 1 (2025): 187–210. <https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612241233539>.

L'intelligenza artificiale sta trasformando in profondità il nostro rapporto con le immagini in movimento. Strumenti come i modelli *text-to-image*, *text-to-video*, *deepfake* e cloni vocali stanno rivoluzionando i processi produttivi e creativi, abbattendo barriere tecniche ed economiche, ma soprattutto ridisegnando i confini dell'autorialità, della rappresentazione e del linguaggio cinematografico. Registi, videomaker e *digital artist* si muovono in territori ibridi che spaziano dal video musicale al cortometraggio, dalla pubblicità ai meme e alla videoarte, dando vita a nuove forme di *storytelling* e ponendo evidenti dilemmi etici e giuridici. È un cambiamento che coinvolge non solo l'estetica, ma anche le logiche industriali e le strutture culturali alla base del cinema. Il numero *All'intersezione tra cinema e IA* indaga criticamente l'impatto dell'intelligenza artificiale sul cinema e sull'audiovisivo contemporaneo, attraverso analisi teoriche e studi di caso, fornendo particolare attenzione al panorama italiano. Un dialogo tra studiosi e artisti che prova a fare luce sulle sfide – ma anche sulle opportunità – di un settore in piena metamorfosi.



università
iulm

ISBN 978-88-99559-90-8



9 788899 559908



Rai Cinema

€ 20,00

