Religious Conflicts Examined Through a Hinge-Theoretic Framework

In this chapter, a hinge-theoretic framework is brought to bear onto the nature of religious conflict. It will be argued that, broadly speaking, there are two main kinds of religious conflict. One kind of conflict is “internal” to the theistic perspective, regarding, for instance, the nature of God, dogmas, etc. In this kind of conflict, the “hinge” proposition “God exists” is shared by participants in the dispute. In this case, the solution may advert to epistemic reasons, at least in principle. Yet a problem remains with respect to the source of the normative authority, which a testimonial source—for example, the Bible—is supposed to exert over and above a different one—for example, the Qur’an. The question then is whether there are non-question-begging and noncircular reasons to accord authority to one testimonial source over the other. In contrast, the conflict between believers and nonbelievers, who do not share a theistic perspective and therefore take opposite stances with respect to the hinge proposition “God exists,” cannot be resolved by adverting to epistemic reasons, not even in principle. The kind of evidence appealed to by the believer—whether testimonial, a priori, or “of the heart”—will be deemed insufficient or question-begging by the nonbeliever. If this is the case, then there is an insurmountable “gulf” between the believer and the nonbeliever such that their perspectives turn out to be mutually alternative and such that only a conversion—understood as a “change of heart” that makes one look at things differently—could not so much as resolve but dissolve the initial conflict.